We consider a sequential social-learning environment with rational agents and Gaussian private signals, focusing on how the observation network affects the speed of learning. Agents learn about a binary state and take turns choosing actions based on own signals and observations of network neighbors' behavior. The observation network generally presents an obstruction to the efficient rate of signal aggregation, as agents compromise between incorporating the signals of the observed neighbors and not overcounting the signals of the unobserved early movers. We show that on any network, equilibrium actions are a log-linear function of observations and each agent's accuracy admits a signal-counting interpretation. We then consider a network structure where agents move in generations and observe all members of the previous generation. The additional information aggregated by each generation is asymptotically equivalent to fewer than two independent signals, even when generations are arbitrarily large. * We thank Drew Fudenberg, Ben Golub, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz, and various seminar participants for useful comments.
Introduction
In many economic environments, information about an unknown state of the world is dispersed among a society of agents. As agents take actions based on their private signals and their observations of social neighbors, the process of social learning gradually aggregates decentralized information into a group consensus.
How does the underlying social network influence how quickly this aggregation happens? This question about the speed of social learning carries important welfare implications. Even if two social networks both lead to the correct group consensus in the long run, agents might quickly achieve high confidence in the correct state with high probability in one network, but remain almost fully uncertain about the state for a very long time in the other.
The economic theory literature contains a large body of work on Bayesian models of sequential social learning, where privately informed agents move in turn and draw rational inferences from their observations. These papers have focused largely on long-run learning outcomes, and less is known about how the social network affects the rate of learning. As Golub and Sadler (2016) 's recent survey points out: "A significant gap in our knowledge concerns short-run dynamics and rates of learning in these models. [...] The complexity of Bayesian updating in a network makes this difficult, but even limited results would offer a valuable contribution to the literature."
The present paper investigates the role of the social network on the rate of rational sequential learning. We avoid some of the "complexity" that Golub and Sadler (2016) mention by focusing on a tractable model that allows us to study the speed of rational learning in different networks but abstracts away from other "obstructions" to efficient learning. We assume the state is binary and agents have Gaussian private signals about the state. We also suppose that agents have rich actions, so players infer their neighbors' beliefs perfectly through their behavior. This rich-signals, rich-actions world strips away other sources of learning rate inefficiency 1 and isolates the role of the social network.
In general, the observation network generates informational confounds for social learning. Suppose an agent observes the actions of a pair of neighbors who have both seen the action of an even earlier mover. From the agent's perspective, this unobserved early action confounds the informational content of the two neighbors' behavior, as the observation network makes it impossible to fully incorporate the two neighbors' private information without over-weighting the early mover's private information. Rational agents solve an optimal signal extraction problem to decide how to aggregate their observations and signals. Networks differ in the severity of such informational confounds, and thus of lead to different rates of Bayesian social learning.
We show that the unique equilibrium of the social-learning game has a log-linear form. We characterize the equilibrium strategy profile that solves agents' signal extraction problems and give a procedure to compute the finite-agent accuracy of social learning. The equilibrium action of each agent is distributed as if she sees some number of independent private signals. This signal-equivalence property characterizes action distributions up to a single parameter measuring the accuracy of beliefs, which simplifies the analysis.
We apply these results to study the speed of learning in the "generations network" where agents are sequentially arranged into generations of size K, with each agent in generation t only observing the actions of every predecessor in generation t − 1. Society learns the true state in the long run for every K, but the speed of learning is eventually slower with larger K. This implies that when private signals are imprecise, accuracy thresholds (e.g., the first agent who is at least 90% confident about the true state at least 90% of the time) are achieved earlier in networks with smaller generations. We also show that no matter the size of the generations, social learning aggregates no more than 3 signals per generation starting with the third generation, and no more than 2 signals per generation asymptotically.
Related Literature
We study rational learning in a sequential model (as first introduced by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) ) with network observations. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) show that in sequential learning environments similar to our model, rational agents learn the true state asymptotically under mild conditions on the network. We instead focus on finite-time learning accuracy and the speed of learning in different networks.
Harel, Mossel, Strack, and Tamuz (2018) study a setting where a fixed group of agents repeatedly receive signals and choose actions each period, learning from each others' past actions. 2 Like in our generations network, they find that the rate of learning can be equivalent to perfectly observing an arbitrarily small fraction of private signals. The mechanism behind their result, "rational groupthink," relies on coarse communication -agents have a finite action space and may get trapped in a wrong consensus for an extended period of time, because small changes in individual beliefs that do not lead to taking a different action are unobservable to other group members. In fact, social learning would proceed at the efficient rate if actions were rich. We highlight a different mechanism for inefficient aggregation of decentralized information: an observation network that generates informational confounds can also lead to rates of learning far below the optimum even in a setting with rich actions.
The coarseness of action space serves as the primary obstruction to efficient rate of social learning in several other papers. Rosenberg and Vieille (2019) consider rational sequential learning with binary actions and relate properties of the private signal distribution to whether the speed of learning achieves a particular benchmark. Hann-Caruthers, Martynov, and Tamuz (2018) compare the rates of learning from past binary actions versus past signals. By contrast, we study network-based obstructions to achieving the efficient rate of learning and characterize this rate asymptotically in some examples, by making stronger assumptions on the informational environment. 3 To the best of our knowledge, Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh, and Ozdaglar (2009) is the only other paper that considers how the rate of rational sequential learning varies with the observation network. In a binary-actions model, they compare two specific network structures where each agent has one neighbor: either their immediate predecessor, or a random past agent drawn uniformly. We give an expression for the equilibrium accuracy of every agent on arbitrary fixed networks.
An alternate approach to calculating speed of learning is to consider naive updating heuristics instead of rational learning, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) . In the DeGroot updating model, Golub and Jackson (2012) show that speed of learning is determined by a simple network statistic that also measures the amount of homophily in the network.
Model
There are two equally likely states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}. An infinite sequence of agents indexed by i ∈ N move in order, each acting once. On her turn, agent i observes a private signal s i ∈ R and the actions of her neighbors, N (i) ⊆ {1, ...i − 1}. Agent i then chooses an action a i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the expectation of
given her belief about ω. So, she will choose the action equal to the probability she assigns to the event {ω = 1}.
We consider a Gaussian information structure where private signals (s i ) are conditionally i.i.d. given the state. We have s i ∼ N (1, σ 2 ) when ω = 1 and s i ∼ N (−1, σ 2 ) when ω = 0, where N (a, b 2 ) is the normal distribution with mean a and variance b 2 , and 0 < 1/σ 2 < ∞ is the private signal precision. Agents' neighbors are defined by a deterministic network with adjacency matrix M. We put M i,j = 1 if j ∈ N (i) and M i,j = 0 otherwise. The network M is common knowledge.
With the network M fixed, let n i := |N (i)| denote the number of i's neighbors. A strategy (1), ..., j(n i )} and when own private signal is s i . 4 Given a profile of strategies (A i ) i∈N , observation (a j(1) , ..., a j(n i |) , s i ) is onpath if it has positive density under the profile. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (equilibrium for short) is a strategy profile (A * i ) i∈N so that for all i and for all on-path observations of i, A * i maximizes the Bayesian expected utility given the (well-defined) posterior belief about ω. We will see that in any equilibrium, s i → A * i (a j(1) , ..., a j(n i ) , s i ) is a surjective function onto (0, 1) for all i and a j(1) , ..., a j(n i ) . So an observation is on-path in equilibrium if and only if all observed actions are interior.
The sequential nature of the social-learning game implies there is a unique equilibrium. Agent 1 who has no social observations must use the same strategy A * 1 (s 1 ) in all equilibria. So agent 2 also only has one equilibrium strategy A * 2 , as the behavior of agent 1 is unique across all equilibria. Proceeding inductively, there is a unique equilibrium profile (A * i ) i∈N .
Linearity of Equilibrium and Measure of Accuracy
We will find it convenient to work with the following log-transformations of variables:s i := ln P[ω=1|s i ] P[ω=0|s i ] ,ã i := ln a i 1−a i . We will calls i the log-signal of i andã i the log-action of i. These changes are bijective, so it is without loss to use the log versions. WriteÃ * i (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) ,s i ) as the (unique) equilibrium map between the log-actions of i's neighbors and i's own logsignal to i's log-action.
In this section, we show that everyÃ * i is a linear function of its arguments, with coefficients that only depend on the network M (and not on the precision of private signals.) We also show that there exist constants (r i ) i∈N with r i ≤ i so that in equilibrium, (a i , ω) is jointly distributed as-if i chooses a i solely based on r i independent private signals. 5 The constants r i depend on the network and may be interpreted as the number of signals that social learning on M aggregates by agent i. This gives a convenient language to compare society's short-run accuracy on different networks.
In general, the behavior of i's neighbors are correlated even after conditioning on the state. Intuitively, i would like to put enough weight on the actions of her neighbors to incorporate their private signals, but doing so carries the risk of over-counting the signals of earlier agents observed by several members of N (i) but not by i. The social network M thus creates an informational confound that generally prevents i from fully extracting the signals of N (i). The equilibrium strategy of i represents the optimal aggregation of her neighbors' actions. The next result shows the optimal aggregation is linear and gives an explicit expression for the coefficients.
The vector of coefficients β i,· is given by
For general private signal distributions, models of Bayesian updating in networks have tractability issues, as Golub and Sadler (2016) point out. The key lemma to proving Proposition 1 is the following property of the Gaussian information structure in our model, which ensures that i's observations have a jointly Gaussian distribution conditional on ω. This permits us to study optimal inference in closed form. Proposition 1 implies that we may find weights (w i,j ) i≥j so that the realizations of equilibrium log-actions are related to the realizations of log-signals byã i = i j=1 w i,jsj . Let W be the matrix containing all such weights. The next result relates β i,· and W and shows that both are independent of the private signal precision.
Proposition 2. LetŴ be the submatrix of W with rows N (i) and columns {1, ..., i−1}.Then β i,· = 1 (i−1) ·Ŵ (ŴŴ ) −1 and the i-th row of W is W i = ( β i,· ·Ŵ ), 1, 0, 0, ... . In particular, neither W nor β i,· depends on σ 2 .
Proposition 2 provides an inductive procedure to compute the coefficients in the unique equilibrium profile and the matrix W. We start with the first row of W, W 1 = (1, 0, 0, ...).
Proposition 2 gives an expression for the equilibrium coefficients β 2,· of agent 2 and the weight she puts on different log-signals, W 2 . This in turn lets us calculate the coefficients and log-signal weights for agent 3, β 3,· and W 3 , and so forth. Equilibrium behavior and logsignal weights depend on the neighborhoods defined by the network M, but not on private signal precision.
We would like to evaluate networks in terms of their short-run social-learning accuracy, so as to compare the rates of Bayesian learning on different networks. Towards a measure of accuracy, imagine that agent i observes n ∈ N independent private signals, but gets no other information about ω. Then, the Bayesian i would play the log-action equal to the sum of the n log-signals, so by Lemma 1 her behavior would follow the distributions a i ∼ N ±n · 2 σ 2 , n · 4 σ 2 , with the positive and negative means conditional on ω = 1 and ω = 0 respectively. Our concept of the speed of learning exploits the fact that on any network, the equilibrium log-action distribution of every agent must follow a generalized version of this distribution with a possibly non-integer n.
Definition 1. Social learning aggregates r ∈ R + signals by agent i if the equilibrium logactionã i has the conditional distributions N ±r · 2 σ 2 , r · 4 σ 2 in the two states.
When agents use a non-equilibrium strategy profile, the conditional distributions ofã i need not equal N ±r · 2 σ 2 , r · 4 σ 2 for any r. Indeed, if this profile results in i putting weights (w i,j ) j≤i on log-signals (s j ) j≤i , thenã i has conditional distributions of the desired form if and only if i j=1 w i,j = i j=1 w 2 i,j . But as the next result shows, the equilibrium log-actions always admit this kind of signalcounting interpretation.
Proposition 3. There exist (r i ) i∈N so that social learning aggregates r i signals by agent i. Here (r i ) i∈N depend on the network M, but not on private signal precision.
It is clear that we must have r i = i j=1 w i,j where w i,j is the equilibrium weight that i puts ons j . Since the matrix of weights W is independent of σ 2 by Proposition 2, we can use (r i ) i∈N as a measure of how the network M affects the speed of rational information aggregation in our social-learning setting. The remainder of the paper studies (r i ) i∈N for different networks.
The Generations Network
As an application of Section 3's general results, we study the speed of rational learning in the generations network. Agents are sequentially arranged into generations of size K. Agents in the first generation (i.e., i = 1, ..., K) have no neighbors. Agents in generation t for t ≥ 2 have all agents in generation t − 1 as their neighbors. 6 That is, for i = (t − 1)K + k where t ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have N (i) = {(t − 2)K + 1, ..., (t − 2)K + K}. 7 Proposition 4. For any K ≥ 1, (a i ) converges to ω in probability. With larger K, social learning aggregates fewer signals per agent asymptotically: r i = i · (2K−1)
is decreasing in K for K ≥ 1. That is, even though society eventually learns the true state with any K, the asymptotic rate of learning is higher with smaller K. Indeed, if K = 1, then every agent perfectly incorporates all past private signals and the speed of social learning is the highest possible. Not only does this comparison about the rate of learning hold asymptotically, but it also holds for all agents i ≥ 16 when comparing among K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
How many signals does social learning aggregate per generation? Intuitively, the answer must be larger than 1. Even though the actions of different predecessors in generation predecessor. By combining the information contained in a single observed action with own private signal, generation t agents can improve on generation t − 1's accuracy by one signal. The next corollary shows this lower bound of 1 is not too far from the actual learning rate. No matter how large K is, social learning aggregates fewer than 2 signals per generation asymptotically. There is also a short-run version of this result: starting with generation 3, fewer than 3 signals are aggregated per generation for any K.
Corollary 1. For any K, social learning aggregates fewer than 2 signals per generation asymptotically. In fact, for any K and any agent i in generation t ≥ 3, r i ≤ K + 3t − 5.
Suppose we are interested in a "confidence threshold" metric of learning efficiency -for instance, how many agents does it take to become at least 90% confident in the true state more than 90% of the time? The next corollary shows that societies with smaller generations reach any such threshold earlier when private signals are imprecise.
Corollary 2. For every 0.5 <ā < 1, 0 <p < 1, and every pair of generation sizes K 1 < K 2 , there exists a bound τ > 0 on signal precision such that whenever 0 < 1/σ 2 < τ , the earliest i such that P[a i >ā | ω = 1] >p is smaller with K 1 agents per generation than with K 2 agents per generation.
Finally, we show that later agents put drastically different weights on the private signals from the first generation and the private signals from the immediate predecessor generation in forming their beliefs about ω. We emphasize that this asymmetric weighting arises in the equilibrium of a Bayesian model where agents engage in optimal signal extraction and make rational inferences about the state. Intuitively, this is because the informational confounds present in the generations network lead to over-counting the earliest movers' signals even for rational players.
Corollary 3. The total weight that generation t puts on the log-signals of generation 1 satisfies K j=1 w (t−1)K+1,j → ∞ as t → ∞, while the total weight that generation t puts on the log-signals of generation t − 1 satisfies
Appendix

A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We show thats i = 2 σ 2 s i . This is becausẽ
The result then follows from scaling the conditional distributions of s i , (s i | ω = 1) ∼ N (1, σ 2 ) and (s i | ω = 0) ∼ N (−1, σ 2 ).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Agent 1 does not observe any predecessors, so clearlyÃ * 1 (s 1 ) =s 1 . Suppose by way of induction that the equilibrium strategies of all agents j ≤ I − 1 are linear. Then eachã j for j ≤ I − 1 is a linear combination of (s ) I =1 , which by Lemma 1 are conditionally Gaussian with conditional means ±2/σ 2 in states ω = 1 and ω = 0 and conditional variance 4/σ 2 in each state. This implies (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n I ) ) have a conditional joint Gaussian distribution with (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n I ) ) ∼ N ( µ, Σ) conditional on ω = 1, and t (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n I ) ) ∼ N (− µ, Σ) conditional on ω = 0, where µ = E[(ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) ) | ω = 1] and Σ = Cov[ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) | ω = 1].
From the the multivariate Gaussian density, (writing (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n I ) ) = a), (1) , ...,ã j(n I ) ) because Σ is symmetric. This then shows agent I's equilibrium strategy must also be linear, completing the inductive step. This argument also gives the explicit form of β I,· .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose N (i) = {j(1), ..., j(n i )} with j(1) < ... < j(n i ). By Lemma 1 and construction ofŴ , we have E [ã j(k) E[(ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) ) | ω = 1] = 2 σ 2 (Ŵ · 1 (i−1) ) = 2 σ 2 1 (i−1)Ŵ . Also, again by Lemma 1 and construction ofŴ , we can calculate that for 1
It then follows from Proposition 1 that β i,· = 2 · 2 σ 2 1 (i−1)Ŵ · 4 σ 2ŴŴ −1 = 1 (i−1) ·Ŵ (ŴŴ ) −1 . Since i puts weight 1 ons i and weights β i,· on (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) ) =Ŵ · (s 1 , ...,s i−1 ) , this shows the first i − 1 elements in the row W i must be β i,· ·Ŵ while the i-th element is 1.
For the last claim, W 1 = (1, 0, 0, ...) does not depend on σ 2 . The same applies to β 1,· . By way of induction, suppose rows W i and vectors β i,· do not depend on σ 2 for any i ≤ I. IfŴ is the submatrix of W with rows N (I + 1), then since N (I + 1) ⊆ {1, ..., I}, by the inductive hypothesisŴ must be independent of σ 2 . Thus the same independence also applies to β I+1,· since this vector only depends onŴ by the result just derived. In turn, since W I+1 is only a function of β I+1,· andŴ , and these terms are independent of σ 2 as argued before, same goes for W I+1 , completing the inductive step.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It suffices to show that E[ã i | ω = 1] = 1 2 Var [ã i | ω = 1]. By Proposition 1,ã i = s i + n i k=1 β i,j(k)ãj (k) . From Lemma 1, we have E[s i | ω = 1] = 1 2 Var [s i | ω = 1]. Furthermore, s i is independent from n i k=1 β i,j(k)ãj (k) , as the latter term only depends ons 1 , ..., (ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) ) | ω = 1] and Σ = Cov[ã j(1) , ...,ã j(n i ) | ω = 1]. Using the expression for β i,· from Proposition 1, E n i k=1 β i,j(k)ãj(k) | ω = 1 = 2 ( µ Σ −1 ) · µ. Also,
using the fact that Σ is a symmetric matrix. This is twice E n i k=1 β i,j(k)ãj(k) | ω = 1 as desired.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We first prove a lemma that expresses β i,· in closed-form for an agent i in generation t + 1. Letã sum be the sum of the log-actions played in generation t − 1 in equilibrium. By the linearity of equilibrium (Proposition 1), there must exist some µ sum , σ 2 sum > 0 so that the conditional distributions ofã sum in the two states are N (±µ sum , σ 2 sum ).
Lemma 2. Each element in
Proof. An application of Proposition 1 shows each agent j in generation t aggregatesã sum and own private signals j according toã j = 2 · µsum σ 2 sumã sum +s j . Next, consider the problem of someone in generation t + 1 who observes the log-actions a j of the K agents j = (t − 1)K + k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K from generation t. By symmetry, i places the same weight on these K log-actions in equilibrium. To find this weight, we calculate
So by Proposition 1,
for every j = (t − 1)K + k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, as desired.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. It is easy to see that for an agent i in generation t, r i ≥ t. This is because each agent could simply infer based on just the action of the first agent in the previous generation. Then, since r i → ∞ with i, we must also get that for every > 0,
Consider an agent i in generation t + 1. From Proposition 3, there must exist x new > 0 so thatã i ∼ N (±x new , 2x new ) conditional on the two states. Using the formula for β i,· from Lemma 2, we have
By contrast, the action of each agent in generation t is distributed as N (±x old , 2x old ) where
x old = 2 · µ 2 sum σ 2 sum + 2 σ 2 . We have
Since lim i→∞ r i = ∞, µsum σsum must grow without bound in generations. In late enough generations, x new − x old is therefore well-approximated by 2 (2K−1) K 1 σ 2 . Since there are K agents per generation, we in fact haveã i ∼ N (±r i · 2 σ 2 , r i · 4 σ 2 ) where r i = i · (2K−1) K 2 + o(i) as desired.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The first claim just comes from Proposition 4 and observing (2K−1) K 2 ·K = (2K−1)/K < 2.
Suppose the conditional log-action distributions in generations t+1 and t are N (±x new , 2x new ) and N (±x old , 2x old ).
A hypothetical agent who observesã sum (the sum of log-actions in generation t) with conditional distributions N (±µ sum , σ 2 sum )and three independent private signals would play a log-action with conditional distributions N (±y, 2y) where We must have P[ã sum > 0 | ω = 1] ≥ P[s 1 > 0 | ω = 1], a probability that just depends on the ratio of the mean and standard deviation. So µsum σsum ≥ 1 σ , i.e. µ 2 sum σ 2 sum ≥ 1 σ 2 . Hence the difference above is positive. This shows x new −x old ≤ 3· 2 σ 2 . Note also that in generation 2, all log-actions from generation 1 are independent, hence µ sum = 2K/σ 2 and σ 2 sum = 4K/σ 2 . This shows agents in generation 3 have log-actions conditionally distributed as N (m 3 , 2m 3 ) where m 3 ≤ (K + 4) · 2 σ 2 . And so in general, the equilibrium log-actions of each agent in generation t ≥ 3 has the conditional distributions N (±m t , 2m t ) where m t ≤ (K + 3t − 5) 2 σ 2 .
